Last week, an Indian parliamentary panel fluttered the dovecotes in Thimphu – Bhutan’s capital – by recommending New Delhi encourage Bhutan to deploy more soldiers in the disputed Doklam area, where a year ago several hundred Indian and Chinese soldiers stood eyeball-to-eyeball, raising real fears of bloodshed.
Non-violent patrol confrontations are common along the undefined, 4,588km Sino-Indian border, but the face-off at Doklam was unique. Indian soldiers were not defending Indian soil; they had crossed into Bhutan and claimed to be acting on Thimphu’s behalf, in accordance with a security treaty between India and Bhutan. For the 73 days that Doklam smouldered, Thimphu walked on eggshells, balancing between India’s stifling embrace and the potential consequences from China.
The Doklam crisis ended with mixed results for India. As the Indian Army chief himself admitted in January, Chinese troops continue to occupy North Doklam, while Indian soldiers have pulled out of Doklam and returned to their outposts in Sikkim. On the positive side, India managed to force China to halt building a road in Doklam, which it was extending southwards, across the Torsa Nala, to its claim line at the Zompelri Ridge, which runs southeast from Mount Gipmochi. Indian military planners believe it essential to enforce Bhutan’s claim line along the Batang La – Sinche La ridge line, about 12-14km north of Zompelri Ridge. They worry that Chinese possession of Zompelri would give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a launching pad to capture the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, a narrow, 29km-wide sliver of land, with Nepal on one side and Bangladesh on the other. It connects mainland India with its eight north-eastern states.
How India and China go to war every day – without firing a single shot
Thus, in confronting China in Doklam, the Indian Army was protecting vital Indian interests more than enforcing the India-Bhutan security pact.
Some Sikkim veterans, like retired lieutenant general SL Narasimhan, who is on India’s National Security Advisory Board, believe concerns about Siliguri are overblown. Breaking through India’s strong border defences in Sikkim would require the PLA to mobilise large bodies of troops, giving India time to reinforce. Chinese troops would have to enter Doklam through the Chumbi Valley which is overlooked by dominating Indian positions that would pound the PLA with artillery, air and ground fire. Were the Chinese attackers to miraculously reach Gipmochi, they would then face the daunting task of advancing to Siliguri through 80km of forested mountains, without artillery or logistic support. Once in Siliguri, the isolated Chinese spearheads would face massive Indian counter-attacks.
Whatever the logic for Doklam, that confrontation has exacerbated Thimphu’s concerns about getting sucked into a Sino-Indian conflict. Bhutanese elites, and increasingly the public, believe they should settle their border with China, not tack a settlement onto India’s more intractable dispute. Beijing has offered Thimphu a strategic swap, in which China would concede to Bhutan disputed territory in the north, in exchange for Doklam. New Delhi, however, firmly discourages conceding Doklam to China.
Non-violent patrol confrontations are common along the undefined, 4,588km Sino-Indian border, but the face-off at Doklam was unique. Indian soldiers were not defending Indian soil; they had crossed into Bhutan and claimed to be acting on Thimphu’s behalf, in accordance with a security treaty between India and Bhutan. For the 73 days that Doklam smouldered, Thimphu walked on eggshells, balancing between India’s stifling embrace and the potential consequences from China.
The Doklam crisis ended with mixed results for India. As the Indian Army chief himself admitted in January, Chinese troops continue to occupy North Doklam, while Indian soldiers have pulled out of Doklam and returned to their outposts in Sikkim. On the positive side, India managed to force China to halt building a road in Doklam, which it was extending southwards, across the Torsa Nala, to its claim line at the Zompelri Ridge, which runs southeast from Mount Gipmochi. Indian military planners believe it essential to enforce Bhutan’s claim line along the Batang La – Sinche La ridge line, about 12-14km north of Zompelri Ridge. They worry that Chinese possession of Zompelri would give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a launching pad to capture the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, a narrow, 29km-wide sliver of land, with Nepal on one side and Bangladesh on the other. It connects mainland India with its eight north-eastern states.
How India and China go to war every day – without firing a single shot
Thus, in confronting China in Doklam, the Indian Army was protecting vital Indian interests more than enforcing the India-Bhutan security pact.
Some Sikkim veterans, like retired lieutenant general SL Narasimhan, who is on India’s National Security Advisory Board, believe concerns about Siliguri are overblown. Breaking through India’s strong border defences in Sikkim would require the PLA to mobilise large bodies of troops, giving India time to reinforce. Chinese troops would have to enter Doklam through the Chumbi Valley which is overlooked by dominating Indian positions that would pound the PLA with artillery, air and ground fire. Were the Chinese attackers to miraculously reach Gipmochi, they would then face the daunting task of advancing to Siliguri through 80km of forested mountains, without artillery or logistic support. Once in Siliguri, the isolated Chinese spearheads would face massive Indian counter-attacks.
Whatever the logic for Doklam, that confrontation has exacerbated Thimphu’s concerns about getting sucked into a Sino-Indian conflict. Bhutanese elites, and increasingly the public, believe they should settle their border with China, not tack a settlement onto India’s more intractable dispute. Beijing has offered Thimphu a strategic swap, in which China would concede to Bhutan disputed territory in the north, in exchange for Doklam. New Delhi, however, firmly discourages conceding Doklam to China.
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